We draw on rational crime theory to help analyse 55 articles that have been retracted from 734 peer-reviewed journals in the field of economics. We highlight and discuss what these findings indicate regarding the nature and pattern of research malpractice in that discipline. Particular attention is given to exploring "no reason" retractions and the policy guidelines of publishers regarding retracted papers. We conclude that the frequent vagueness of retraction statements, and a reluctance to signal research malpractice, generally results in little damage to the reputation of caught, and known, offenders. Thus, a key deterrent to engaging in research malpractice is lacking. To reduce the incidence of research malpractice, we offer several recommendations for publishers and journal editors.
There is clear evidence that academic economists engage in QRPs (Necker, 2014; Wible, 2016) . Studies by Karabag and Berggren (2012; have analysed QRPs in 6 and 43 retracted papers in economics, respectively. However, knowledge of the frequency, nature and pattern of research malpractice within the discipline remains rudimentary. To address this, we analyse 55 articles that have been retracted from 734 peer-reviewed journals in economics. This is the largest evidential base of retractions analysed to date in peer-reviewed studies in the field of economics. Nonetheless, the results should be regarded as indicative, rather than exhaustive. They draw attention to problems of poor research practice in the field.
As Fanelli (2013, p .1) has argued, it is likely that the statistics obtained in studies of the type we conduct "are proportional not to the prevalence of misconduct but to the efficiency of the system that detects it." Given the secretive and often shameful nature of research malpractice, a complete picture of its prevalence seems unlikely to be obtained. Therefore, we do not suggest that an increasing level of retractions can be equated with an actual rise in research malpractice. Rather, increased retractions seem likely to be caused by increased vigilance on the part of editors, publishers, reviewers and readers. Mindful of these caveats, we contend that the data analysed here offer valuable insight to the forms of malpractice that occur, even if its full extent is not fully documented.
Our analysis also raises important issues about the high incidence of "no reason" retractions in economics journals.
We make three important contributions. First, we highlight the forms of malpractice that drive retractions in peer-reviewed journals in economics. In doing so, indicative data regarding the frequency and nature of research malpractice in the discipline are provided. We also explore the incentives that prompt (allegedly) "rational" researchers to use QRPs. This leads us to suggest ways of eliminating those incentives in order to improve the integrity of research. Second, we recommend some actions that publishers and journal editors should take to deal more effectively with research malpractice. The associated discussion highlights the incidence of "no reason" retractions, reviews publisher guidelines on retraction, and proposes ways of reducing the frequency with which journals retract papers without stating a clear reason. Third, we propose a global protocol for dealing with retracted papers.
We illuminate the incentives for research malpractice with a view to identifying possible remedies. We conclude that the vagueness of retraction statements, and a general reluctance to signal research malpractice, often results in little damage to the reputation of known offenders. Thus, a key deterrent to partaking in research malpractice is lacking. Moreover, deterrents are constrained by the limited resources applied to detection. For example, it is not sufficient to rely on the goodwill and discretionary time of editors and reviewers to assess academic research content. The incentive structures that influence journal editors are generally unhelpful. Editors are likely to be concerned that any signalling of research malpractice will damage the reputation of their journals.
Thus, some editors may be less likely to offer clear signals regarding the prospect that QRPs appear in papers they publish.
The present exploration of research malpractice in economics analyses articles retracted from economics journals ranked in journal lists issued by the U.K.'s Chartered Association of Business Schools (ABS) and the Australian Business Deans' Council (ABDC). Both of these lists are used widely beyond the UK and Australia, particularly in countries where formal assessments of research quality occur. Despite much criticism that ranking lists distort research by prioritising the status of individual journals above the content of the articles they publish (e.g. Tourish and Willmott, 2015) , these lists are much favoured by university managements because of their convenience and auditability.
We begin by reviewing existing evidence of research malpractice in economics, before describing the research methods we employ. Then we present findings, discuss how retracted papers are dealt with by journals, and highlight the need to examine the corpus of publications of authors who have had papers retracted. To improve current practices in respect of retracted papers, we conclude by offering some recommendations to editors and publishers.
Literature Review
Here we review studies of cost/benefit incentives in the context of research malpractice, before clarifying the meaning of "research malpractice" and then reviewing prior studies of research malpractice in economics.
Our analysis of researcher engagement in QRPs is informed by traditional economic behaviour theory. This assumes that individuals will seek to maximise their private gain whenever they can. In particular, we follow an "economics of rational crime" framework, drawn from Becker (1968 ) and Ehrlich (1974 , 1996 . Becker (1968) theorized that there were parallels between how people respond to opportunities for criminal activity and how they behave in a normal commodity market. Thus, in invoking an "economics of rational crime" framework, we consider the behavioural relations that exist between perpetrators of crime, victims of crime, and those attempting to stop crime. Becker (1968 ) and Ehrlich (1974 , 1996 have contended that the decisions of a potential criminal follow a rational economic choice: that is, a rational individual will weigh the perceived benefits of a decision to commit a crime against the perceived costs of doing so. The cost to an individual of committing a crime includes the resources used evading apprehension, the punishment if convicted, the probability of being apprehended, the foregone wages, and the taste (or distaste) for crime (which includes the impact on an individual's moral values, predisposition towards crime, and risk preferences) (Ehrlich, 1996) . The costs are greater when the punishment and the chances of apprehension are higher, when the costs of avoiding detection are higher, when an individual has a higher moral objection to crime, and when an individual is more risk adverse. Becker (1993, p. 5) enters the caveat that although "many people (are) constrained by moral and ethical considerations… police and jails would be unnecessary if such attitudes always prevailed." Calculation, he argues, is built into criminally-oriented decisions.
Consistent with this theoretical lens, obvious benefits are obtainable from research malpractice, including relief from the time and costs involved in data collection and analysis. Beyond that, Craig et al. (2014) highlight how a culture of routinely subjecting research outputs to performance audit has taken hold in universities, especially those which are determined to improve ranking positions in (inter)national league tables. One consequence of this is that academics are under more pressure than ever to publish in reputable journals. They are rewarded by universities through career progression and salary increases if they do so, but are often penalised if they do not (e.g., by being moved to teaching only contracts) (McNay, 2016) .
Offsetting the benefits of engaging in malpractice are the costs of doing so.
These can be imputed as a combination of the probability of detection, the likely severity of punishment, and the perceived reputational damage to the perpetrator.
Such theorising leads to a conclusion that the likelihood of a researcher engaging in QRP's is reduced by any increase in the probability of detection, and in the penalty (including reputational damage) if detected (Wible, 2003; Collins et al., 2007) . In line with this, a recent review of rational choice perspectives on crime by Pogarsky et al. (2017, pp. 85-86) concluded that:
The results of longitudinal studies of panel data have revealed that offending is negatively related to the perceived certainty of punishment… and perceptions of sanction certainly are responsive to whether an actor has been punished for past offending experiences… Moreover, the results of randomized experiments have shown that rule breaking is reducible by clearly communicating an elevated risk of punishment to potential offenders (italics applied).
In addition, we should be mindful of research findings revealing that ethical dispositions can be overwhelmed by the situations and opportunities people face, to the point that they also sometimes overcome the fear of detection and sanction (Clarke and Cornish, 1985) .
If rational academic economists consider that the benefits accruing from engaging in research malpractice outweigh the likely costs, at least some of them are likely to be tempted to engage in research malpractice (Rose-Ackerman, 1978) . Lacetera and Zirulia (2011) have argued that the chances of being detected are small because of the unobserved nature of some of the practices involved (e.g., fabrication of data or the gifting of authorship). They contend also that research malpractice is likely to be widespread and hard to detect in research fields (such as economics) where incremental advances are provided, and, where there is low or nonexistent scrutiny of the authenticity of research data. Thus, there is ample encouragement for a rational researcher in economics to engage in research malpractice (Misangyi et al., 2008; Pillay and Kluvers, 2014) .
In many fields (including economics) the cost of engaging in research fraud is lowered by the reluctance of social science journals to publish replication studies. 1 Replications hold strong prospect of confirming the strength of a field or illustrating problems within it. Yet, many researchers report grave difficulty in publishing replications, particularly in journals where the replicated studies originally appeared (French, 2012) . The infrequency of replication allows poorly supported or errant findings to remain undetected (Madden et al., 1995; Eden 2002; Stroebe et al., 2012; Ioannidis, 2012; Bakker et al., 2012; Denison et al., 2014) . This encourages those who are contemplating engaging in research malpractice to actually do so.
In accord with such a view, Hoover (2006) argued that it is rational for an author to engage in malpractice, given current incentives and problems of detection.
For example, a plagiarist might be emboldened by knowing that the sole responsibility for exposing a plagiarist falls to an original author or whistle-blower, rather than an impartial sanctioning body. There are likely to be high financial and emotional costs borne by an individual in exposing a plagiarist. This paper promotes discussion of how the processes of detection, deterrence and retraction can be improved.
What Constitutes Research Malpractice?
Research malpractice includes fabrication (invention of data); falsification (inaccurate presentation of research, including omission of inconvenient results); plagiarism (inaccurate or unattributed use of someone else's work) (Banks et al. 2016; Lewis et al., 2011) ; self-plagiarism (recycling portions of an author's own previous work without acknowledgment) (Bruton, 2014) ; and financial misconduct (non-disclosure of financial interests in research and misuse of research funds) (Hiney, 2015) . These are well-known practices. However, two further less wellknown practices are p-hacking and HARKing (Hypothesizing After the Results are Known). P-hacking involves such actions as reporting only studies that deliver the desired p-value; terminating a study when a desired p-value has been reached; and dropping items from survey instruments that prevent attainment of 'desirable' p-values (Simmons et al., 2011; John et al., 2012; Academy of Medical Sciences, 2015) . P-hacking also includes simply changing reported p-levels so that they suddenly become "significant" (Burns and Ioannidis. 2016) . A study of approximately 250 retractions in psychology found errors with p-values in 10% of papers, of which 90% favoured the authors' interpretations (Bakker and Wicherts, 2011) . This supports the view that many retractions attributed to errors in data analysis are likely to have their origins in p-hacking or the outright invention of data.
Chambers (2017) describes p-hacking as "the sin of hidden flexibility" because how researchers actually analyse their data is deliberately reported selectively or kept secret from editors, reviewers and ultimately readers. This conduct often involves a form of "data torture" in which the data are interrogated mercilessly until they support a given hypothesis. Such an approach risks saturating the literature with false positives, known as Type 1 errors (Starbuck, 2016) , and "undead theories" that are used widely, but which are nevertheless unsound (Ferguson and Heene, 2012) .
HARKing involves presenting hypotheses as if they were developed a priori rather than ex-post.
(For an example in economics, see http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030440760100077X). HARKing is claimed to exaggerate the predictive power of theories under study, improve researchers' prospects of obtaining statistically significant results, lead to "the adoption of theories and practices that are assumed erroneously to have obtained solid scientific support," and make "the methods sections of many papers works of creative fiction rather than rigorous accounts of how (and in what sequence) research was conducted" (Authors, 20XX. See also Schwab and Starbuck, 2016; Garud, 2015) . European economists found that 24% reported self-plagiarising and 32% reported presenting empirical findings selectively to confirm an argument. These data suggest that the existing level of retractions in economics understate the actual level of malpractice. QRPs in economics arise despite many leading journals in the discipline stating explicitly that they adopt the guidelines of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE). 2 Other leading journals in economics comply with COPE guidelines (although this is unstated) in a form of implicit adoption. The "Retraction Guidelines" published by COPE are quite clear. They advise that retraction notices should state "who is retracting the article"; "the reason(s) for retraction (to distinguish misconduct from honest error)"; and should avoid "potentially defamatory or libellous" statements. 3 COPE also advises that "the main purpose of retractions is to correct the literature and ensure its integrity rather than punish authors who misbehave"
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(https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2802086/).
Nevertheless, editors seem to be wary of making retractions. The Retraction
Watch website (http://retractionwatch.com/) has documented many cases of authors taking legal action to prevent retraction of their papers. 4 The prospect of a disgruntled author suing a journal editor or publisher seems to partly explain the high incidence, reported below, of "no reason" retractions and the general lack of transparency in other retraction notices. The vulnerability of editors to litigation diminishes the prospect of exposing all erring authors. misconduct-expressions-of-concern-and-retraction.html.
Method
Our research questions are:
1. What is the current level of retractions in the field of economics?
2. What are the main reasons given for retractions?
3. How clear are retraction statements and how useful are they for the field?
To address these issues, we analysed 55 articles that have been retracted from 734 peer-reviewed journals in economics. These 734 journals comprised the 316 economics journals listed in the field "ECON" [that is, "Economics, Econometrics Guide rates journals according to quality from 4* (highest) to 1. Combining both sources (converting ABDC rankings to the ABS ranking system) 5 yields a journal list comprising 26 journals ranked 4* or 4; 94 ranked 3; 226 ranked 2; and 388 ranked 1. We do not explore hundreds of other non-listed journals, such as "pay for publication" journals and/or "predatory" journals with weak or non-existent review processes. 6 Nor do we explore other modes of research dissemination in economics (such as book chapters, conference proceedings, and working papers).
Using Google Scholar, we searched serially for the terms "retraction", "retracted", "withdrawn", and "withdrawal" in each of the 734 economics journals of interest. This yielded 74 retracted (or withdrawn) journal articles. We excised 19 of these articles because they had not been retracted for engaging in QRPs (five were retracted for unspecified reasons but were subsequently re-published; eleven were retracted because of "accidental duplication" of the article in the same journal; and three were retracted because of an "administrative error," such as publishing a rejected article by mistake. Thus, we were left with 55 articles that had been retracted from economics journals for engaging in QRPs.
To We examined statements announcing a retraction to identify the reason for retraction. We identified the journals associated with "no reason" retractions and reviewed the retraction policy guidance provided by their publishers. Table 2 summarises the 55 retracted articles in terms of time taken to retract, number of citations, and journal quality. However, this does not necessarily mean they had no effect on scholarly thinking: academics will have spent time studying them, even if they eventually concluded that they did not merit citation. Fourteen retracted articles were published by journals ranked as 3 or above in the ABS Guide. Most retractions appeared in journals ranked as 2 (n=38). The article with the most citations (81) was retracted in 2014 for plagiarism from Economic Modelling, seven years after publication.
Results

Profile of Retracted Papers
The highest ranked journal to retract a paper was the American Economic Review [AER] (rated 4* in the ABS Guide). An article by Kunce et al. (2002) documented by RePEc have not been retracted and remain available for scholars to access. The websites of the journals involved indicate no concern about the malpractice. 7 This is surprising given the prominence of these journals in their field, shown here in parentheses as (ABS/ABDC/Scimago) indicates: Applied With these caveats in mind, we report that in science generally, "over the past decade, retraction notices for published papers have increased from 0.001% [that is, 1 in 100,000] of the total to only about 0.02% [2 in 10,000]" (Van Noorden, 2011). Günther (2016) , drawing on Sanders (2016) , reported that the retraction rate in journals available on the PubMed database has increased steadily in recent decades, and that the rate was about 3.9 per 10,000 articles published in 2007.
With respect to PsycINFO database journals, Günther (2016) reported a retraction rate of about 3.6 per 10,000 articles in 2011. Collectively, these data are disturbing. However, the most pressing concern should not be for the relativity of published retraction rates, but with focusing remediation efforts on reducing the incidence of questionable research practices.
In accord with rational crime theory, the deterrent effect of reputational damage to researchers for committing research malpractice is weakened by the inability to reliably identify retracted papers and to disclose reasons for retraction.
Furthermore, failure to clearly watermark a retracted paper as having been retracted, or to remove it from a journal's website, may lead other researchers to inadvertently continue to be influenced by its content, and continue to cite it. For The validity of previous work by the author of a fraudulent paper cannot be assumed. Editors may ask the author's institution to assure them of the validity of other work published in their journals, or they may retract it. If this is not done, editors may choose to publish an announcement expressing concern that the validity of previously published work is uncertain.
Disclosure of Reasons for Retraction
(http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/publishing-and-editorialissues/scientific-misconduct-expressions-of-concern-and-retraction.html)
In terms of rational crime theory, Zaman's actions suggest that the deterrents in place to curb QRPs (such as the reputational damage arising from published retraction notifications combined with the probability of being apprehended) were considered sufficiently low compared to the benefits of committing research fraud. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014861951500051X).
In business and management, p-hacking and other QRPs are strongly implicated in retractions, although these are often ascribed to problems with data analysis (Author, 20XX) . Thus, many such retractions make it clear that p-values have been reported incorrectly or inappropriate statistical tests have been used.
However, allegations of malpractice are generally avoided, since (conveniently) the original raw data are usually reported by the authors to be unavailable for further analysis. It is unlikely that the field of economics would be completely free of problems arising from p-hacking. The extent of the problem is masked by the large number of retractions that offer no reason.
Providing an ambiguous or vague retraction notice diminishes the deterrence of research malpractice by lowering the cost to the researcher of engaging in QRPs.
Although some people might infer malpractice by the author, s/he has the option of plausible denial. It means that those who are guilty of research fraud may be able to continue academic work, retain papers in circulation that should justly be investigated, and continue to publish (possibly) fraudulent or defective work in peer reviewed journals.
The 28 "no reason" retractions within a year of publication had generated 46 citations on Google Scholar. With one exception, all "no reason" retractions were from a journal published by Elsevier. In general, the level of observed "no reason" retractions (51%) is high in comparison to the level reported in business and management. In the latter discipline area, 10% of retraction notices gave "no reason" or "vague reasons" -such as simply stating there were "errors" in data analysis, but without explaining what these were (Author 20XX) . The much higher rate of "no reason" retraction in economics may be due to the editors of economics journals being "more rational" and less willing to risk legal action from aggrieved authors.
The high volume of retractions from journals published by Elsevier is not reflected in the size of Elsevier's market share -at least as that share is proxied by the proportion of total economics journals it publishes that are represented in the ABS Guide and ABDC list (see Table 4 ). Whilst Elsevier's market share is only 9.5%, it was responsible for 84% of the 55 retracted papers. 11 Elsevier's strong presence in our database of retracted articles may be attributable to its high level of proficiency We explored whether the publishers named in Table 4 committed themselves to stating clear reasons for retracting an article. Clear policies on retraction, and rigorous enforcement of those policies, would increase the penalties for research malpractice. This would thereby reduce the incentive to engage in such conduct. Table 5 reports the results of this further exploration. Most publishers stated no clear commitment to identifying explicit reasons for retraction. This means that no reasons, vague reasons, or euphemisms are provided -if any are provided at all. Yet several publishers refer with approbation to the COPE and ICMJE guidelines. These require a statement of the reasons for retraction. But our analysis points to this rarely occurring. For example, Wiley cites the COPE and ICMJE guidelines and states that a retraction notice "should enable the reader to identify and understand why the article is being retracted, or should explain the editor's concerns about the contents of the article."
Nonetheless, it includes a diluting rider that ''The COPE guidelines have no legal force and it is generally prudent to avoid 'naming and shaming' authors and simply to confirm a retraction, when necessary, in neutral and concise terms."
This stance seems inconsistent with the COPE (and ICMJE) guidelines, both of which advise that clear reasons should be given for retraction.
The lack of clarity regarding reason for retraction opens the possibility that some retractions arising from fabrication and falsification are attributed instead to "errors." Such an outcome will spare the feelings of the authors involved, but reduce the disincentives to engage in malpractice by ensuring that perpetrators can continue with their research careers. Note that the National Library of Medicine (NLM) policy (cited approvingly by Elsevier) allows the practice of not differentiating "between articles that are retracted because of honest error and those that are retracted because of scientific misconduct or plagiarism." Overall, the publishers' policy statements are insufficiently rigorous, often ambiguous, and frequently unclear about what actions to take in response to serious researchrelated offences.
Remedies
Endeavours to reduce the level of research malpractice in published research should seek to reduce the benefits obtained from doing so, and increase the likely costs involved, consistent with rational crime theory. This could include the ambitious task of persuading universities to be less preoccupied with their ranking in various national and international league tables; to be less intense in their hyperdrives to "improve" research performance; and to commit to support a moratorium on awarding bonuses to academics for publishing in ( what are perceived to be) top journals (Chapman and Lindner, 2016) . We contend that while current priorities prevail, the problems discussed will intensify. In terms of costs, increasing the certainty of enforcement and the associated fine (or punishment) will at least help deter some offenders. It would also ensure that fewer offenders are able to continue publishing problematic research in peer reviewed journals.
Publishers' own commercial interests and their publicly stated commitments to "ethicality in publishing" should prompt stronger action on their part. The growing awareness of malpractice diminishes public confidence in the integrity of research.
Publishers share in the problems this causes, since if the view that something is seriously awry gains momentum, more questions will be asked about how publishers contribute positively to the publication process. At present, publishers can claim to be safeguarding quality by providing robust editorial support, and by eliminating poor work from journals. If that claim erodes, so does much of their unique selling point. People may become more insistent in asking whether the traditional model of journal publication has outlived its usefulness. On the other hand, if publishers are seen to take robust action against malpractice then they will put themselves in a stronger position to show that they add value. Below, with a view to improving the current situation, we make four specific proposals that are directed mainly at publishing houses and journal editors.
Proposal 1
The publishing house responsible for the journal from which a paper is retracted for research malpractice (henceforth the "retracting publishing house") should be required to collate an inventory of all journal articles and other scholarly works published by the retracted author. The retracting publishing house should then formally advise other publishing houses responsible for publishing the works 
Proposal 2
All journals should be required to issue clear statements of the reasons for retraction, in accord with recommendations of COPE and ICMJE (referred to earlier). If this is not done, then journal home pages should remove any explicit statement or implicit suggestion of compliance with COPE and ICMJE (or similar) guidelines regarding ethical publishing. Simply stating who instigated a request for retraction is not helpful to the wider scholarly community. Such statements obscure the extent of malpractice and limit the possibility of others learning from errors that have occurred.
Proposal 3
The text of a retracted paper should be clearly watermarkled as retracted.
Otherwise, defective work will continue to be cited and influence scholarly thinking. 12 All retracting publishing houses should ensure they remove the text of all retracted papers from journal web sites and other databases and search engines.
Proposal 4
Publishing houses should require authors to supply de-identified raw data with all submissions. We understand the proprietary attitude of many academics to "their" data. However, we believe that researchers have a greater obligation to demonstrate ethical research practices by lodging data in a way that facilitates inspection, reanalysis and replication. This would act as a bulwark against the perpetration of data fraud, or poor analysis, and enable journals to give clearer justifications for retractions. It means that poor statistical analysis or unjustifiable forms of phacking would be identified and dealt with more easily. The burden of proof regarding data authenticity and data analysis needs to shift from those with questions, to those who produce the results (Clark, 2017) . Some journals now do what we suggest. We argue that it should become common practice.
Discussion and Conclusion
We have highlighted the paucity of information provided about the reasons for retracting articles from peer-reviewed journals in economics. The work of Retraction Watch, RePEc, and the authors cited in Table 1 , go some way to redressing the balance. Our results strongly suggest the need for economics journals to be much more explicit about the reasons for retraction. Two benefits would flow from this. First, there would be a much clearer indication of the level of retraction for unacceptable research practices, including data fraud, plagiarism and self-plagiarism. Second, it would be much clearer to researchers in economics that engaging in research malpractice will harm their careers. This would increase the threat of reputational damage (a key attribute to deterring research malpractice in a rational crime framework) and reduce the influence of such articles in further research.
The issues raised above are of fundamental importance. There is growing concern whether State funding for universities is money spent wisely and ethically (Goodstein, 2010) . Each instance of unethical behaviour damages public trust in academic research at a time when such trust is vitally important. Yet, the reward and incentive systems within academia seem perversely designed to encourage poor practice (Harris, 2017) . This points to the likelihood that the problems discussed will remain, and possibly intensify. Nonetheless, there needs to be greater awareness of QRPs and their harmful effects. Action by multiple stakeholders is required to increase the costs and reduce the benefits of these practices.
The proposals made here are intended to stimulate debate and to prompt the academic community to move forward on these crucial issues. One way this could occur would be to investigate, and to model, the incentives that influence journal editors to not publish specific reasons for retraction. 13
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Rosenbaum Sensitivity analysis for average treatment effects in matched observational studies Multiple submissions: "The article is a duplicate of a paper … already … published in the J. Theoretical Prob. (2010), 23: 362-377. One of the conditions of submission … is that authors declare explicitly that the paper is not under consideration for publication elsewhere … this was not detected during the submission process. As a sanction, J. Theoretical Probability will not allow the authors … to participate in the journal in any way until Jan. . (JMVA). The paper was rejected by JMVA and after two revisions it was accepted by CSDA in July 2009. On November 17, 2009, the Editor-in-Chief was notified … that … the paper was submitted to two journals around the same time … the author indicated that he [did so] to ensure prompt publication. One of the conditions of submission … is that authors declare explicitly that the paper is not under consideration for publication elsewhere … this article represents a severe abuse of the scientific publishing system." 36 2010/09 Mehrara Effects of oil price shocks on industrial production Energy Econ. 3/2.71/Q1/0 No reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the author." 2010/08 Hahn Convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities Econ. Letters 3/0.51/Q2/5 Flawed reasoning/analysis: "Because of an error discovered by Berger, Hahn is retracting his letter. The paper claims to prove that a strategy-adjustment process called 'fictitious play' converges to an equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities. However, as shown by Berger, the proof of convergence is flawed."
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Kunce, Gerking, Morgan
Effects of environmental & land use regulation in the oil & gas industry
American Econ. Rev. 4*/3.67/Q1/5 Incorrect conclusion: "Findings presented in the original paper cannot be substantiated because the data furnished by IHS Energy Group cannot be used to identify differences between drilling costs on lands under different ownership."
